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means of an intuitive decomposition of the incidence of a selective capital tax into 
a "specificity effect" and a "mobility effect". 
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1. CAPITAL INCOME TAXATION ANO MOBILlTV 
Formal general-equilibrium analysis of the effects of a selective capital 
income tax (SCIT) within the standard two-sector, two-factor model of tax 
incidence was first carried out by Harberger (1962). In the Harberger model factors 
of production are assumed perfectly mobile across industries. The introduction of 
a SCIT in one sector initially drives a wedge between the returns to capital in the 
two industries, thus initiating a chain of reactions throughout the economy. The 
taxed sector will tend to substitute relatively cheap labor for relatively expensive 
capital, thus making capital owners worse-off. At the same time, however, as 
production of the taxed industry falls, the wage-rental ratio rises (falls) if the taxed 
industry is capital-(labor) intensive. The overall effect of SCIT upon the wage-rental 
ratio is "a priori" ambiguous. 
In recent years, Harberger's analysis has been extended in many directions. 
The assumption of perfect factor mobility has been relaxed in a number of papers 
(for example, McLure, 1971; Ratti and Shome, 1977; Bhatia, 1989). These 
extensions posit the existence of a fixed factor. In this context, a SCIT will be 
borne by the owners of the taxed capital, regardless factor substitucion and factor 
intensities. 
The use of extreme assumptions on factor mobility has precluded a formal 
explanation of systematic relationships between mobility and shifting. The purpose 
of this paper is to characterize the role of mobility in the shifting process in a 
Harberger-type model with partially-mobile factors. This is done by means of a 
meaningful decomposition of the incidence of the SCIT into a "specificity effect" 
and a "mobility effect". 
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2. THE MODEL 
A closed economy is assumed to produce two final outputs, X and Y, using 
capital, K, and labor, L. Technologies are CRS. Under competition, the behavior of 
producers is completely described by the equality of price and average cost: 
(1 ) 
(2) 
where p is the relative price of X in terms of Y (numéraire), c¡ (i=X,Y) is the unit-
cost function with the standard properties, r¡ and w¡ are the net rewards of capital 
and labor, and TKX = 1 +tKX , where t KX is a selective "ad valorem" tax on capital 
used in sector X. Full employment of factors is ensured by perfect flexibility of 
factor returns: 
(3) 
(4) 
whE¡re the terms in the left-hand side are factor demands. Total supplies of labor 
and capital are fixed. 
Factor preference, moving costs or other unspecified causes make labor and 
capital imperfectly mobile. A parametric formulation of this mobility condition is: 
(5) 
(6) 
where Pj (j:K,L) is the supply elasticity of the j-th factor to sector X with respect 
to the net earnings differential, and a hat denotes rate of change of the 
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corresponding variable in a neighborhood of its equilibrium value. The 
microeconomic foundations of equations (51 and (61 can be found elsewhere (for 
example, see Manning and Sgro, 1975, Mussa, 1982, Grossman, 1983, and 
Casas, 19841. 
Preferences over goods are represented by a single homothetic utility 
function. Aggregate demand for X is: 
x = X(p,Z) (71 
where Z '" pX + Y. This definition of income is valid when the SCIT is "small" and 
revenues are returned back to consumers in a lump-sum fashion. In equilibrium, 
Walras' Law allows to ignore the demand function for Y. 
The general-equilibrium system (11-(71 can be solved for the change in factor 
prices using the convenient properties of Jones' algebra (see Jones, 1965, and 
Atkinson and Stiglitz, 19801. After so me manipulation, the incidence of a SCIT in 
sector X upon rx can be expressed as: 
where 
1 II = ULUKI,+ULI2+UKI3+Ux!7"aO 
n = 1 Al 8Kx!7o-Óx!7x 
I, = uol 81 1 Al +óx!7x+ó.,oy 
I 2 = ALxBK.,ox!7o+AL"ay(8Lx!7x+8Kx!7ol 
I3 = AKxBL.,ox!7o+AK.,oy(8Kx!7x+8Lx!7ol. 
(81 
UD is (minusl the compensated elasticity of the demand for X. Aji is the share in the 
total supply of factor j of the amount of this factor employed in sector i. 8j; is the 
share of the j-th factor in the value of the i-th producto The remaining short-hand 
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relatively labor-intensive in the physical (the value) sense if \ ,\ \ (\ e\) > O. At an 
initial undistorted equilibrium, \ ,\ \\ e\ >0 (see Neary, 1978). 
3. THE SPECIFICITV ANO THE MOBILlTV EFFECTS OF A SCIT 
Here we aim at an expression that separates the incidence of the tax upon 
impact from the general equilibrium effects that take place once factors are allowed 
to move in response to the tax. To do this, we can reexpress (8) as: 
'x = rx + r: (9) 
where the specificitv effect (superscript S) is the tax induced response of rx when 
capital is immobile, and the mobility effect (superscipt M) represents the portion 
of the tax that capital in sector X succeeds in passing on to other factors of 
production through mobility. 
Trivially, with uK=O, rx=-'tKX ' i.e. rx falls by the amount of the tax. 
Subtracting from (8), the mobility effect can be written as: 
(10) 
condition for any shifting to take place is that capital be mobile. On the other hand, 
equation (10) indicates that the degree of labor mobility largely determines the 
proportion of the tax that is shifted. The link between mobility and shifting that the 
former decomposition establishes is best characterized in two main results: 
Proposition 1. Sufficient conditions for capital in sector X to bear less than 
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the full burden of the tax, i.e. ;:>0, are: (i) I JI I :1:0, for all uK>O, uL>O, and 
(ii) UL = O, for all UK > O. 
Suppose that Uo = O initially. Then, as labor is substituted for capital at a 
fixed level of output of X, the net return to capital will start to rise. If we now 
allow uo~O, an additional factor intensity differential effect will further encourage 
shifting when I JI I ~ O by creating an economy-wide excess demand for the factor 
intensively used in the untaxed sector as industry X cuts down production. Result 
(ii) emerges as a special case when the intensity differential does not play any role. 
Provided that Y is not produced by means of a Leontief-type technology, capital 
in X always gains from mobility when labor is sector-specific. 
Is it possible that capital in X actually loses from mobility when trying to 
escape the tax? We know that under the assumption of perfect capital mobility, 
capital may end up bearing more than the full amount of the tax (Harberger, 1962). 
Equation (10) indicates that this is not possible when any factor is immobile. This 
implies that although mobility is necessary for any shifting to be possible, it is not 
sufficient to improve the position of capital owners. 
Proposition 2. Necessary conditions for capital in X to bear more that the full 
burden of the tax, i.e. ;:<0 ,are that both factors be mobile and that sector X 
be relatively capital-intensive. These, together with either: (i) uo .... oo and uy = O, or 
(ii) uo .... oo and uL .... oo, or (iii) ux....o and uy....o, suffice to ensure a negative mobility 
effect. 
4. TAX SHIFTING UNDER INCREASED MOBILlTY 
The available literature on tax incidence has neglected the analysis of the 
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effects of changes in the degree of mobility upon tax shifting. This is not 
surprising, since the existing models are special cases of (1 )-(7) when uj is either 
o or <Xl. From equation (10), we can obtain: 
. 8PK = 
(11 ) 
(12) 
Since n2 is non-negative, the qualitative effect of changes in mobility upon 
tax shifting depends on the sign of nI' Capital in sector X will favor policies 
intended to increase capital mobility when n, >0 (industry X relatively labor-
intensive or "moderately" capital-intensive) and oppose those intended to increase 
the mobility of labor when n, <O (industry X "highly" capital-intensive). From 
Proposition 2 we know that the mobility effect may be harmful for capital in sector 
X only if this industry is relatively capital-intensive and there are no immobile 
factors. When a negative factor intensity differential effect dominates, owners of 
capital in sector X will favor policies to reduce its impacto Restrictions on labor 
mobility will always do the jobo The case for an increase in capital mobility is just 
symmetric. 
Finally, note that when technical substitution Is not possible in either sector 
(U¡-+O) , tax shifting beco mes independent of factor mobility considerations 
(whenever uj>O). Capital in sector X gains (loses) relative to the immobility 
benchmark as I el > « )0. 
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